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A New Voting Rights Act for a New 
Century 
HOW LIBERALIZING THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT’S 
BAILOUT PROVISIONS CAN HELP PASS THE 
VOTING RIGHTS ADVANCEMENT ACT OF 2017 
INTRODUCTION 
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA)1 opened avenues for 
Rosanell Eaton’s political voice that had previously been closed by 
Jim Crow laws. In 2013, Rosanell Eaton was a ninety-two-year old 
African American woman living in her hometown of Louisburg, 
North Carolina.2 Despite growing up in a segregated town, Eaton 
graduated as valedictorian of her class, overcame literacy test 
requirements to register to vote, voted regularly in North Carolina 
elections, and helped other members of her community register 
and vote.3 For her civic activism, Eaton experienced racist acts such 
as having small crosses burned in her front yard and even having 
bullets shot at her house.4 She nevertheless remained an active 
voter.5 Despite her leadership, Eaton fell under threat of losing her 
vote after North Carolina passed its voting law in 2013, H.B. 589, 
which reduced days for early voting, instituted voter identification 
requirements, eliminated same-day registration, and restricted 
out-of-precinct provisional ballots.6 
Though the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit struck H.B. 589 down in 2016, the law prevented 
North Carolinians, like Eaton, from voting for three years.7 H.B. 
 
 1 Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as 
amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (2012 & Supp. II 2015)). 
 2 Complaint at 7, N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP. v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204 
(4th Cir. 2016) (No. 1:13-CV-00658), ECF No. 1. 
 3 Id. at 7–9. 
 4 Id. at 8. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. at 8–9; see also H.B. 589, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2013), Voter 
Information Verification Act, 2013 N.C. SESS. LAWS 2013-381, pt. 2 (detailing Part 2 of H.B. 
589 in which the law required the use of photo identification for voting in person). 
 7 N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 241–42 (4th Cir. 
2016); Editorial, North Carolina’s Voting Law Goes on Trial, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2015), 
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589 was able to go into effect, because, earlier in 2013, the 
United States Supreme Court in Shelby County v. Holder 
invalidated the VRA’s coverage formula,8 which was used to 
prevent select jurisdictions from passing voting laws without 
federal oversight.9 Writing for the majority, Chief Justice 
Roberts argued that the VRA’s coverage formula was 
unconstitutional due to (1) its use of outdated data to identify 
which jurisdictions fell under the preclearance provision; and (2) 
its violation of the “‘fundamental principle of equal sovereignty’ 
among the States.”10 Chief Justice Roberts then stated that if 
Congress still intended to “divide the States” to enforce the 
Fifteenth Amendment, it must identify the targeted jurisdictions 
based on “current conditions.”11 By nullifying the coverage 
formula, the Supreme Court severely limited the VRA’s power to 
challenge discriminatory voting laws.12 Congress subsequently 
took on the challenge of drafting a new coverage formula to fit 
such “current conditions.”13 
In response to the Supreme Court’s ruling, members of 
the House and Senate introduced identical bills called the Voting 
Rights Advancement Act (VRAA) of 2017.14 Congress drafted the 
VRAA with the purpose of updating the VRA’s coverage 
formula.15 Republicans have not supported the VRAA, however, 
giving the bill little to no chance of passage.16 Though the VRAA 
 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/15/opinion/north-carolinas-voting-law-goes-on-trial.html 
[https://perma.cc/LG7J-JNTD]. 
 8 52 U.S.C. § 10303(b) (2012 & Supp. II 2015). The coverage formula of the 
VRA set forth two elements to determine if a state should be put under federal 
jurisdiction for approval of any new voting laws. The first element was whether the state 
or a political subdivision of the state had in place “a test or device” in place on November 
1, 1964. If so, the federal government moved to the second element to determine if less 
than 50 percent of persons of voting age were registered to vote on November 1, 1964, or 
that less than 50 percent of persons of voting age voted in the presidential election of 
November 1964. If both elements were satisfied, then the state would be placed under 
the rules of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act: The 
Formula for Coverage Under Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 
(Dec. 21, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/crt/section-4-voting-rights-act#formula 
[https://perma.cc/7V38-WYAV] [hereinafter DOJ Section 4]. 
 9 Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 557 (2013). 
 10 Id. at 551, 554–57. 
 11 Id. at 553. 
 12 See The Cost (in Time, Money, and Burden) of Section 2 of the Voting Rights 
Act Litigation, NAACP LEGAL DEF. FUND http://www.naacpldf.org/document/cost-time-
money-and-burden-section-2-voting-rights-act-litigation [https://perma.cc/W9LN-QB85] 
[hereinafter NAACP LDF]. 
 13 Shelby Cty., 570 U.S. at 553. 
 14 H.R. 2978, 115th Cong. § 1 (2017); S. 1419, 115th Cong. § 1 (2017). 
 15 H.R. 2978; S., 1419. 
 16 Katanga Johnson, House Democrats Seek Voting Rights Act Improvements, 
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (June 22, 2017, 5:34 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/
national-news/articles/2017-06-22/house-democrats-move-to-restore-key-provisions-
of-the-voting-rights-act [https://perma.cc/4RZB-5X7X] (reporting Representative Sewell 
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updates the coverage formula, it fails to address concerns about 
equal sovereignty among the states. Congress could do so by 
updating the bailout provisions of the VRA.17 Congress included 
the bailout provisions in the VRA to tailor the coverage formula 
for jurisdictions that passed discriminatory voting laws.18 To 
address the concerns of Congressional Republicans and the 
Supreme Court, this note argues that Congress should amend 
the bailout provisions to complement the VRAA of 2017. With a 
new coverage formula and amended bailout provisions, the VRA 
will not only protect the right to vote, it will also actively 
encourage more Americans to register and cast their ballots, 
creating more representative governments on the local, state, 
and federal levels. 
This note proceeds in five parts. Part I explains the need 
for the VRA and its successful defense against the initial 
constitutional challenge of South Carolina v. Katzenbach. Part 
II describes the VRA’s subsequent uses by Congress, and the 
Supreme Court’s growing suspicions of the VRA’s 
constitutionality in Northwest Austin v. Holder. Part III 
discusses the Shelby County decision and the avenues it left open 
for Section 4(b)’s coverage formula. Part IV examines Congress’s 
attempt to restore the VRA by way of the VRAA. Part V proposes 
amendments to the bailout provisions of the VRA to increase the 
likelihood of the VRAA’s passage. 
I. THE ORIGIN OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965 
Before passage of the VRA of 1965, federal prosecutors 
litigated voting rights violations, such as literacy tests and poll 
taxes, on a case-by-case basis in controversies such as Guinn v. 
United States and Smith v. Allwright.19 Prosecutors had little 
 
as saying that “no Republicans were willing to support the [bill]”); H.R. 2978 (115th): 
Voting Rights Advancement Act of 2017, GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/
congress/bills/115/hr2978 [https://perma.cc/M464-RFG3]; S. 1419 (115th): Voting Rights 
Advancement Act of 2017, GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/115/s1419 
[https://perma.cc/7HY4-G3QJ]. 
 17 Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437, 438–39 (codified 
as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10303(a)(1) (2012 & Supp. II 2015)) (describing the bailout 
provisions which are practices a jurisdiction must end, procedures that must be deemed 
no longer necessary, such as the use of federal examiners, and measures that may be 
enacted, such as making voter registration more convenient, in order to receive a 
declaratory judgment from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia). 
 18 J. Gerald Hebert, An Assessment of the Bailout Provisions of the Voting 
Rights Act, in VOTING RIGHTS ACT REAUTHORIZATION OF 2006: PERSPECTIVES ON 
DEMOCRACY, PARTICIPATION, AND POWER 257 (Ana Henderson ed., 2007). 
 19 Introduction to Federal Voting Rights Laws: Before the Voting Rights Act, 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Aug. 16, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/crt/introduction-federal-
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success following this strategy, and black voter registration 
rates remained well below the rates of white voters.20 To remedy 
the problem of case-by-case litigation, Congress passed the 
VRA.21 With the enactment of the VRA, Congress required the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) and the United States District 
Court for the District of Columbia to challenge and review 
proposed voting laws in certain jurisdictions before the laws 
were implemented.22 
A. The Voting Rights Act Explained 
The VRA was designed to protect all eligible U.S. voters 
from having their vote “denied or abridged on account of race or 
color . . . in any Federal, State or local election . . . or in any 
political subdivision of such State.”23 Through 52 U.S.C. § 10302 
(Section 2), the Attorney General or a private citizen can 
challenge electoral practices implemented with a racially 
discriminatory purpose.24 Section 2 applies to all states;25 52 
U.S.C. § 10303 (Section 4)26 and 52 U.S.C. § 10304 (Section 5),27 
on the other hand, applied only to states and political 
subdivisions falling under Section 4(b)’s coverage formula28 and 
allowed the DOJ or the District Court for the District of Columbia 
to challenge a proposed voting law before implementation.29 
Congress brought states under the coverage formula if they had 
(1) maintained a “test or device”30 restricting registration or the 
 
voting-rights-laws [https://perma.cc/7LFP-VLAC]; see also Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 
649, 650–52 (1944); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 354 (1915). 
 20 Id. 
 21 KEVIN J. COLEMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43626, THE VOTING RIGHTS 
ACT OF 1965: BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW 12 (2015). 
 22 History of Federal Voting Rights Laws: The Voting Rights Act of 1965, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE (July 28, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/crt/history-federal-voting-rights-
laws [https://perma.cc/3B5P-J62W]; see also Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 
79 Stat. 437, 452 (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10304(a) (2012 & Supp. II 2015)). 
 23 Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437, 438 (codified as 
amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10303(a)(1) (2012 & Supp. II 2015)). 
 24 COLEMAN, supra note 21, at 14; Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 
79 Stat. 437, 446–47 (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10302(a) (2012 & Supp. II 2015)). 
 25 52 U.S.C. § 10302(a); COLEMAN, supra note 21, at 13. 
 26 Id. 52 U.S.C. § 10303. 
 27 Id. § 10304. 
 28 Id. § 10303(a)(1); COLEMAN, supra note 21, at 16 (showing that Alabama, Georgia, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Virginia, thirty-nine counties in North Carolina, and 
select counties in Arizona and Hawaii were covered under Section 4(b)’s formula). 
 29 About Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act: Coverage Under the Special 
Provisions of the Voting Rights Act, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Dec. 4, 2017) [hereinafter DOJ 
Section 5], https://www.justice.gov/crt/about-section-5-voting-rights-act [https://perma.cc/
2F3B-T9WE].  
 30 52 U.S.C. § 10303(c) defines a “test or device” as: 
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act of voting on November 1, 1964; and (2) less than 50 percent 
of eligible voters were registered to vote on November 1, 1964 or 
less than 50 percent of eligible voters actually voted in the 
November 1964 presidential election.31 Congress mandated 
states falling under Section 4(b)’s formula to meet the 
preclearance requirements of Section 5 to make any changes to 
their electoral process.32 
Under the preclearance regime, covered jurisdictions 
applied to the DOJ or the District Court for the District of 
Columbia for permission to implement proposed voting laws.33 
Unlike Section 2, Sections 4 and 5 shifted the burden of proof 
from the plaintiff to the challenged jurisdiction.34 Covered 
jurisdictions therefore submitted evidence to show that the 
proposed laws did not racially discriminate against voters.35 The 
DOJ and the District Court for the District of Columbia used 
these provisions to protect and enforce voting rights in an 
unprecedented manner after the failure of case-by-case 
litigation.36 As the coverage formula risked covering an excessive 
number of jurisdictions, Congress included a bailout provision 
for jurisdictions that had not discriminated against voters 
within a specified time frame.37 
A jurisdiction could be released from the coverage 
formula and the preclearance regime by obtaining a bailout;38 to 
do so, a jurisdiction appealed to a three-judge panel of the 
District Court for the District of Columbia for a declaratory 
judgment.39 The appealing jurisdiction had the burden of proving 
that it had not racially discriminated, by purpose or effect, 
 
any requirement that a person as a prerequisite for voting or registration for 
voting (1) demonstrate the ability to read, write, understand, or interpret any 
matter, (2) demonstrate any educational achievement or his knowledge of any 
particular subject, (3) possess good moral character, or (4) prove his 
qualifications by the voucher of registered voters or members of any other 
class. 
52 U.S.C. § 10303(c) (2012 & Supp. II 2015). 
 31 DOJ Section 4, supra note 8; Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 
79 Stat. 437, 448 (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10303(b) (2012 & Supp. II 2015)). 
 32 COLEMAN, supra note 21, at 16–17; Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-
110, 79 Stat. 437, 452 (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10304(a) (2012 & Supp. II 2015)). 
 33 DOJ Section 5, supra note 29. 
 34 See COLEMAN, supra note 21, at 17. 
 35 See DOJ Section 5, supra note 29. 
 36 Introduction to Federal Voting Rights Laws: Before the Voting Rights Act, 
supra note 19. 
 37 See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 331 (1966); Voting Rights 
Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437, 447–48 (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. 
§ 10303(a) (2012 & Supp. II 2015)). 
 38 Hebert, supra note 18, at 259. 
 39 Id. 
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against voters of color.40 Before a full year passed, the VRA faced 
its first legal challenge which included challenges to the 
coverage formula, preclearance regime, and bailout provisions.41 
B. South Carolina v. Katzenbach Presents the First Legal 
Challenge to the Voting Rights Act 
In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, South Carolina 
attempted to enjoin the federal government’s efforts at enforcing 
the VRA.42 Among its many contentions, South Carolina argued 
that the coverage formula and the preclearance provisions of the 
VRA were beyond Congress’s delegated powers and violated “the 
principle of the equality of States.”43 Additionally, South 
Carolina asserted that the responsibility of making and applying 
specific remedies to Fifteenth Amendment violations should be 
left entirely to the purview of the courts.44 
The Supreme Court, however, noted that the federal 
government had previously attempted to litigate voting rights 
violations after they had occurred rather than demanding that 
certain states alert the federal government of the proposed 
changes before they were enacted.45 The Court also 
acknowledged that some states under the coverage formula had 
previously created new rules for the “sole purpose of 
perpetuating voting discrimination in the face of adverse federal 
court decrees.”46 After noting that the preclearance regime was 
an “uncommon exercise of congressional power,”47 the Court 
reasoned that “exceptional conditions can justify legislative 
measures not otherwise appropriate.”48 After validating the 
coverage formula and preclearance provisions, the Court ruled 
on the VRA’s bailout provisions. 
The Supreme Court examined the bailout provisions of the 
VRA,49 which, at the time, could be used after five years of not 
enacting any discriminatory voting laws or policies.50 Against the  
 40 Id. at 259–60. 
 41 See Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 307; see also Hebert, supra note 18, at 259. 
 42 Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 307. 
 43 Id. at 323. 
 44 See id. at 327. 
 45 Id. at 328. 
 46 Id. at 335. 
 47 Id. at 334. 
 48 Id. (citing Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934); Wilson 
v. New, 243 U.S. 332 (1917)). 
 49 52 U.S.C. § 10303(a)(1) (2012 & Supp. II 2015). 
 50 Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 331. Congress amended the Voting Rights Act in 
1970 and required states to be free of VRA violations for ten years before gaining 
eligibility to use the bailout provisions. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. 
No. 91-285, sec. 3, § 4(a), 84 Stat. 314, 315 (1970). 
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contention that the provisions placed “an impossible burden of 
proof upon States,” the Court opined that the burden of 
submitting affidavits to (1) prove that a state had not 
discriminated against racial minorities for five years; and (2) 
rebut any evidence to the contrary offered by the federal 
government was a “quite bearable” burden of proof, because 
states and political subdivisions had specific knowledge about 
facts concerning the conduct of voting officials.51 The Court 
therefore upheld the VRA even though the preclearance measure 
presented an unprecedented level of federal involvement in 
affairs delegated to states.52 The VRA thus properly enforces the 
Fifteenth Amendment53 and makes racial discrimination in voting 
unconstitutional.54 Indeed, the VRA, throughout its history, 
successfully prevented discrimination in voting.55 
II. THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN ACTION 
A. Immediate Effects of the Voting Rights Act 
After being signed into law, the VRA took immediate 
effect by sending federal examiners into jurisdictions to register 
black voters.56 Black voters in southern states began seeing 
sharp increases in their registration rates.57 Black voters were 
then able to translate their increased registration rates into 
increased political representation.58 Furthermore, black 
southerners were able to leverage their political power to gain 
 
 51 Id. at 332. 
 52 Id. at 337. 
 53 U.S. CONST. amend. XV. 
 54 Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 337. 
 55 See COLEMAN, supra note 21, at 12. 
 56 52 U.S.C. § 10302(a) (2012 & Supp. II 2015); Introduction to Federal Voting 
Rights Laws, The Effect of the Voting Rights Act, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.
justice.gov/crt/introduction-federal-voting-rights-laws-0 [https://perma.cc/EZ62-XTG2]. 
 57 Introduction to Federal Voting Rights Laws, The Effect of the Voting Rights 
Act, supra note 56. Almost one million black Americans registered to vote within four 
years of the Voting Rights Act’s passage. COLEMAN, supra note 21, at 12. Mississippi 
went from having only 5% of its black voting population registered to vote in 1956 to 
32.9% in 1966. Id. at 13. After just two more years, nearly 60% of black Mississippi voters 
were registered. ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF 
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 212 (rev. ed. 2009); WALDMAN, THE FIGHT TO VOTE 
159 (2016). By 1998, 71% of black Mississippi voters were registered to vote. WALDMAN, 
supra note 57, at 159. In Alabama, the black voting population registered to vote at a 
rate of 11% in 1956 and increased its voter registration rate to 57% in 1968. COLEMAN, 
supra note 21, at 13; KEYSSAR, supra note 57, at 212. The black voting age population in 
North Carolina experienced an increase in registration rates going from 24% in 1956 to 
51% in 1966. COLEMAN, supra note 21, at 13. Most dramatically, black voters in 
Tennessee saw their registration rate increase from 27% in 1956 to 71.7% in 1966. Id. 
 58 “[T]he number of black elected officials in the South [increased] from [seventy-
two] to 159, after the 1966 elections.” COLEMAN, supra note 21, at 12. 
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economic opportunities.59 Minority voters, as a whole, also 
witnessed increased legal protections stemming from the 
preclearance regime.60 
The VRA brought new jurisdictions under its preclearance 
coverage through its Section 4(b) formula.61 Texas, Arizona, and 
Alaska were covered in their entirety in 1975.62 The VRA brought 
smaller jurisdictions such as two townships in Michigan and 
counties in South Dakota, California, New York, Florida, and 
North Carolina under the preclearance regime by 1976 as well.63 
Regarding voting laws actually challenged and blocked under 
Section 5, the DOJ received over one thousand submissions of 
challenged laws with each submission possibly containing 
multiple allegedly discriminatory laws.64 The DOJ ultimately 
issued over three thousand objections.65 States and their political 
subdivisions took notice of these enforcement actions and 
adjusted their electoral practices accordingly.66 Between 2000 and 
2012, the DOJ received over two hundred thousand submissions 
yet issued only seventy-six objections.67 Five years after the VRA 
was passed, covered jurisdictions, believing they had ceased using 
discriminatory tests and devices, applied for a bailout.68 
Jurisdictions applied for declaratory judgments to release 
them from the preclearance regime in 1970 and continued to do so 
 
 59 Black southerners experienced an increase in public and private sector 
employment as well as an “increase in . . . state transfer payments.” See James C. Cobb, 
The Voting Rights Act at 50: How It Changed the World, TIME (Aug. 6, 2015), 
http://time.com/3985479/voting-rights-act-1965-results/ [https://perma.cc/5ZW2-XV6K]. 
 60 COLEMAN, supra note 21, at 12 (showing that the DOJ reviewed “[over] half 
a million voting changes submitted under Section 5”). 
 61 52 U.S.C. § 10303(b) (2012 & Supp. II 2015). 
 62 Jurisdictions Previously Covered by Section 5, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Aug. 
6, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/crt/jurisdictions-previously-covered-section-5 [https://
perma.cc/CLS5-C9UP]. The Voting Rights Act also began protecting language minorities 
in 1975 by demanding that jurisdictions with large enough “limited English proficiency” 
populations produce “bilingual ballots, translated voting materials, and oral language 
assistance.” Glenn D. Magpantay, Sound Barriers Ver. 2.0: The Second Generation of 
Enforcement of the Language Assistance Provisions (Section 203) of the Voting Rights 
Act, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 63, 67–68 (2014); see also Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975, 
Pub. L. No. 94-73, sec. 203, § 4, 89 Stat. 400, 401–02 (1975). 
 63 Jurisdictions Previously Covered by Section 5, supra note 62. 
 64 According to data compiled by the Justice Department, approximately 1,102 
submissions were filed, the vast majority of which related to issues of vote dilution. Mark 
A. Posner, The Real Story Behind the Justice Department’s Implementation of Section 5 
of the VRA: Vigorous Enforcement, As Intended by Congress, 1 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 79, 102–04 (2006). 
 65 Id at 102. According to the Justice Department, approximately 3,126 
objections were made. Id. 
 66 Id. at 103. 
 67 Rick Pildes & Dan Tokaji, What Did VRA Preclearance Actually Do?: The 
Gap Between Perception and Reality, ELECTION L. BLOG (Aug. 19, 2013, 4:39 AM), https://
electionlawblog.org/?p=54521 [https://perma.cc/HMX3-KNXZ]. 
 68 Hebert, supra note 18, at 259–60. 
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through 1984.69 By 1970, Alaska and counties in Arizona, Idaho, 
and North Carolina had obtained bailouts in the initial round of 
applications.70 By 1975, New York had obtained approval to be 
bailed out of the preclearance regime.71 Alaska obtained a bailout 
once again after some of its counties were covered after 1970.72 By 
1982, jurisdictions in Maine, Oklahoma, and New Mexico had 
obtained bailouts.73 Members of Congress who approved extensions 
of the VRA’s preclearance regime looked favorably upon such 
bailouts as evidence that jurisdictions would not be perpetually 
punished once they began complying with federal voting laws.74 
Since the initial passage of the VRA, Congress has 
amended and extended the law several times.75 Through these 
amendments, Congress also made changes to the bailout 
provisions.76 By adding the bailout provisions to the original VRA, 
 
 69 Id. at 260–61. 
 70 Id. at 260. Gaston and Nash counties in North Carolina failed to obtain 
bailouts. Id. 
 71 Id. The Voting Rights Act, however, covered counties in New York again in 
1974. Id. Virginia also failed to satisfy the bailout provisions. Id. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. at 261. 
 74 See Timothy G. O’Rourke, Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982: The New 
Bailout Provision and Virginia, 69 VA. L. REV. 765, 766–67 (1983). 
 75 Congress amended the Voting Rights Act in 1970, 1975, 1982, 1992, and 
2006. COLEMAN, supra note 21, at 19. The Katzenbach Court noted that the use of Section 
5 was “an uncommon exercise of congressional power” addressing “exceptional 
conditions.” South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 334 (1966). Congress, therefore, 
set time limits on the VRA and extended its application only after reviewing voting 
conditions. Robert A. Kengle & Marcia Johnson-Blanco, What Is Next for Section 5 of the 
Voting Rights Act?, 39 AM. BAR. ASS’N: HUM. RTS. MAG. (Oct. 23, 2012), 
https://www.americanbar.org/publications/human_rights_magazine_home/2012_vol_39
_/winter_2012_-_vote/what_is_next_forsection5ofthevotingrightsact/ [https://perma.cc/
M3WE-3FSB]. The 1970 amendments extended the prohibitions on literacy tests, ended 
durational residency requirements for presidential elections, extended Section 5’s 
preclearance coverage to jurisdictions in northern and western states such as New York, 
California, and Alaska, lowered the voting age to eighteen, and more. Voting Rights Act 
Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314, 314–19 (1970); COLEMAN, supra 
note 21, at 19–20. In the 1975 amendments, Congress extended the Voting Rights Act 
for seven more years. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, 89 Stat. 
400 (1975); COLEMAN, supra note 21, at 20. Congress also permanently banned the use 
of literacy tests, expanded Section 5 and Section 8’s protections to language minorities, 
and permitted individuals to (1) bring a suit against a jurisdiction to bring it within 
preclearance coverage and (2) request the use of federal examiners in a jurisdiction, 
along with other policies. COLEMAN, supra note 21, at 20–21. In the 1982 and 1992 
amendments, Congress extended the requirements and protections for bilingual 
elections. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131, 134 
(1982); Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-344, 106 Stat. 921, 921–
22 (1992); COLEMAN, supra note 21, at 21–22. In the 1982 amendments specifically, 
Congress amended Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act to allow plaintiffs to establish a 
violation by showing that a voting law discriminatorily impacted racial or language 
minorities regardless of the legislator’s intent. COLEMAN, supra note 21, at 22. 
 76 Congress amended the Voting Rights Act’s bailout provisions in 1970, 1975, 
and 1982. Hebert, supra note 18, at 260–61. The bailout provision of the Voting Rights 
Act allows a jurisdiction covered by Section 5 to apply for a declaratory judgment from 
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Congress reasoned that the coverage formula of Section 4(b) 
would be imprecise and that unfairly covered jurisdictions would 
need a vehicle to exit the preclearance regime.77 The bailout 
provision also survived judicial scrutiny from the Supreme Court 
in South Carolina v. Katzenbach.78 When representatives from 
Virginia attempted to weaken the bailout provisions during the 
1975 debates to amend the provisions, other members of the 
House rejected the proposed amendments.79 Representative 
Abner Mikva specifically argued that the amendments should be 
rejected on the ground that they attempted to weaken the VRA 
by removing preclearance coverage.80 Subsequently, Congress 
passed the bailout provisions with even more stringent 
requirements, declaring that a state had to show that it had not 
used a discriminatory “test or device” in seventeen years.81 
Though the bailout provision and the VRA as a whole continued 
to garner approval from Congress, jurisdictions under Section 5 
coverage still challenged the law’s legality when denied an 
opportunity to bailout of coverage.82 
B. City of Rome v. United States Clarifies Which 
Jurisdictions Are Eligible for the Bailout Provisions 
The U.S. Attorney General brought Georgia under the 
VRA’s preclearance regime in 1965, bringing the city of Rome, 
 
the District Court for the District of Columbia if it can show that during ten consecutive 
years before petitioning for declaratory judgment it has (A) not used a racially 
discriminatory test or device denying or abridging the right to vote; (B) not received a 
final judgment from a United States court that it used a racially discriminatory test or 
device to deny or abridge the right to vote; (C) not been assigned any federal examiners 
or observers; (D) brought all governmental units within its jurisdiction into compliance 
with the Voting Rights Act; (E) repealed any changes that the Attorney General 
successfully objected to or to which the District Court for the District of Columbia denied 
a declaratory judgment; and (F) eliminated voting measures which “inhibit or dilute” 
access to the ballot and engaged in efforts to expand opportunities for registration and 
voting. Even after receiving a declaratory judgment, the jurisdiction remains under the 
District Court for the District of Columbia’s jurisdiction for ten years, and if any 
subsequent violations occur, the jurisdiction will be placed on the preclearance regime 
again. 52 U.S.C. § 10303(a)(1)(A)–(F) (2012 & Supp. II 2015). If no violations occur within 
those ten years, however, the court will release the jurisdiction from both the court’s 
jurisdiction and the preclearance regime. Id. § 10303(a)(5). The bailout provisions 
originally required states to prove non-discriminatory behavior for five years, but 
Congress extended the amount of time to ten years during the 1970 amendments. Voting 
Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-284, 84 Stat. 314, 315 (1970); Hebert, 
supra note 18, at 262. 
 77 O’Rourke, supra note 74, at 773. 
 78 Id. at 773–74 (citing South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 324, 332 (1966)). 
 79 See id. at 779–81. 
 80 121 CONG. REC. 16,767–68 (1975) (statement of Rep. Mikva). 
 81 Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, sec. 101, § 4(a), 
89 Stat. 400, 400 (1975); Hebert, supra note 18, at 260. 
 82 See, e.g., City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 162 (1980). 
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Georgia under Section 5 coverage as well.83 Rome attempted to 
make several changes to its electoral system in 1966 following 
electoral changes made that same year by the state of Georgia.84 
In addition to its electoral changes, Rome annexed surrounding 
land sixty times between November 1, 1964 and February 10, 
1975.85 Under the VRA, annexations “constitute[d] a change in a 
‘standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting.’”86 
Therefore, Rome was required to report each annexation to the 
Department of Justice for approval.87 After Rome sought to gain 
preclearance for an annexation in 1974, “[t]he Attorney General 
discovered that [additional] annexations had occurred” and 
requested additional information.88 After reviewing the 
annexations and the 1966 electoral changes, the Attorney 
General denied preclearance to Rome’s electoral changes as well 
as thirteen of the city’s sixty annexations.89 Rome then filed an 
action in court “based on a variety of claims.”90 Among the claims 
to reach the Supreme Court, Rome argued that it should be bailed 
out of Section 5 coverage as a city in compliance with the VRA.91 
The Court, contrary to Rome’s pleadings, ruled that cities as 
“political units of a covered jurisdiction” could not independently 
apply for a bailout.92 
Rome asserted that under the ruling of United States v. 
Board of Commissioners of Sheffield, Ala. it qualified as either a 
“political subdivision” or a “State” for Section 4(a) bailout purposes, 
but the Supreme Court disagreed.93 Instead, the Court agreed with 
the district court below in ruling that Section 4(a)’s bailout 
 
 83 Id. at 160–61 (citing 30 Fed. Reg. 9,897 (Aug. 7, 1965); United States v. Bd. 
of Comm’rs, 435 U.S. 110 (1978)). 
 84 Id. at 160–61. 
 85 Id. at 161. 
 86 Id. (quoting Perkins v. Mathews, 400 U.S. 379, 381 (1971)). 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. at 162. 
 91 Id. The City of Rome also argued before the Court that: (1) the VRA only 
vitiated voting laws that had a discriminatory intent rather than solely a discriminatory 
effect, id. at 172; (2) that, the VRA was unconstitutional if it did, indeed, invalidate 
voting laws that were discriminatory only in effect, id. at 173; (3) that the VRA “violate[d] 
principles of federalism.” Id. at 178; and (4) that the VRA’s preclearance requirement 
had outlasted its usefulness by 1975. Id. at 180. The Court, however, held that (1) based 
on Congressional intent, the VRA did vitiate voting laws that had a discriminatory effect 
without discriminatory intent, id. at 172; (2) that § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment 
empowered Congress to pass a law invalidating voting laws with only a discriminatory 
effect, id. at 173; (3) that “appropriate legislation” passed to enforce the Civil War 
Amendments overrode principles of federalism, id. at 179; and (4) that Congress had 
made a “considered determination” to extend the preclearance regime from 1975 to 1982. 
Id. at 172–73, 179, 182. 
 92 Id. at 167. 
 93 Id. at 168. 
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provision applied only to states and political subdivisions covered 
within an uncovered state rather than to political subdivisions 
within a covered state.94 Furthermore, the Court opined that under 
Section 4(a), a municipality did not fall under the definition of a 
“political subdivision” or a “State.”95 Therefore, the VRA survived 
the legal challenge asserted by Rome, which subsequently denied 
the city its ability to use the bailout provision.96 Afterwards, 
Congress made additional changes to the bailout provision.97 
“Congress enacted two major revisions to the bailout 
provisions” in 1982.98 Political subdivisions were allowed to bail 
out separately from their states through the first revision.99 The 
bailout provision was also revised to “recognize and reward” 
jurisdictions complying with the law as opposed to simply 
“requir[ing] them to await an expiration date which is fixed 
regardless of the actual record.”100 Speaking as a co-sponsor of 
the then bill of amendments, Senator William V. Roth, Jr. stated 
that “the principle [the bill] embrace[d]” was “that every citizen 
has the right to cast an effective vote and is entitled to all the 
protections that are necessary to insure this right.”101 Senator 
Roth later stated that, “S. 1992 incorporates bipartisan 
compromises that reflect input from many of varied ideologies. 
These compromises represent the consensus that there was a 
need for an incentive and reward for those jurisdictions that were 
diligent in their abidance to the act.”102 After the 1982 revisions, 
twelve jurisdictions, all of which were in Virginia, bailed out of 
Section 5 coverage.103 Following the 1982 revisions104 to the 
bailout provision and the 2006 extension of the VRA,105 the VRA 
received its most difficult challenge in 2009.106 
 
 94 Id. at 167–69. 
 95 Id. at 168. 
 96 Id. 169. 
 97 Hebert, supra note 18, at 262–63 (explaining how the 1982 amendments 
allowed political subdivisions such as cities to bailout of Section 4(b) coverage even if the 
state remained covered and allowed jurisdictions to apply for a bailout if they believed they 
had a ten-year record of non-discrimination rather than wait for a set deadline to pass). 
 98 Id. at 262. 
 99 Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131, 
131–34 (1982); Hebert, supra note 18, at 262. 
 100 Hebert, supra note 18, at 262. 
 101 128 CONG. REC. 14,310 (1982) (statement of Sen. Roth). 
 102 Id. 
 103 Hebert, supra note 18, at 266. 
 104 Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131. 
 105 Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act 
Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-246, 120 Stat. 577. 
 106 See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 193 (2009). 
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C. The Supreme Court Gives a Warning Shot on the Voting 
Rights Act’s Constitutionality in Northwest Austin 
“Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One 
(NAMUDNO) was created in 1987 . . . [from] a portion of Travis 
County, Texas” to provide city services to its residents.107 Though it 
was “responsible for its own elections,” it did not register voters nor 
run the elections.108 Section 5 covered NAMUDNO as if the district 
was a municipality of Texas, a covered state, though the 
municipality itself had no record of racial discrimination in its 
electoral practices.109 In Northwest Austin v. Holder, NAMUDNO 
filed for a bailout but argued that if it failed to meet the bailout 
requirements, then Section 5 of the VRA was unconstitutional.110 
The District Court interpreted the term “political subdivision” to 
“include[ ]  only ‘counties, parishes, and voter-registering 
subunits.’”111 A political subdivision like NAMUDNO that did not 
register its voters, by definition, could not be bailed out as a 
“political subdivision.”112 The Supreme Court, however, began to 
express skepticism for the continued need of Section 5 because of 
its “federalism costs.”113 
The Court noted that voter registration rates and voter 
turnout rates between white and black Americans were reaching 
parity, distinguishing the conditions of NAMUDNO’s claim from 
the conditions of previous voting rights claims in which the VRA 
remained unaltered.114 Though the VRA deserved credit for the 
improved circumstances, Chief Justice Roberts wrote that, 
“[p]ast success alone, however, is not adequate justification to 
retain the preclearance requirements.”115 The Chief Justice 
continued by expressing concern over the VRA’s continued 
violation of the “equal sovereignty” of the states after the 
improvements in voter turnout and registration rates.116 He 
further conveyed apprehension over the fact that disparities in 
voter turnout and registration were becoming wider in uncovered 
 
 107 Id. at 200. 
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Id. at 200–01. 
 111 Id. at 201. (quoting Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Mukasey, 573 F. 
Supp. 2d 221, 232 (2008)). 
 112 Id. at 197. 
 113 Id. at 202. Specifically, Chief Justice Roberts expressed concern at the continuing 
broad powers of the VRA, stating, “Section 5 goes beyond the prohibition of the Fifteenth 
Amendment by suspending all changes to state election law—however innocuous—until 
they have been precleared by the federal authorities in Washington, D.C.” Id. 
 114 See id. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. at 203. 
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jurisdictions than they were in covered jurisdictions.117 Moreover, 
the Court noted that there was not a settled answer regarding 
which standard to apply to determine if Section 5 of the VRA 
remained constitutional.118 Despite these concerns, the Court 
withheld judgment on the constitutionality of the VRA as the 
Chief Justice wrote that doing so is “the gravest and most delicate 
duty that this Court is called on to perform.”119 Instead of ruling 
on the constitutionality of the VRA, the Court limited its review 
to the bailout provision.120 With such a ruling, the Court allowed 
the preclearance regime to remain in play but also signaled to 
Congress its need to revise preclearance requirements and the 
coverage formula.121 
Addressing the bailout provisions, the Chief Justice took 
aim at the statutory meaning of “political subdivision,” noting 
how “the statutory definition . . . [did] not apply to every use of 
the term” in the VRA.122 Building on its statutory interpretation, 
the Court considered Congress’s 1982 amendments to the bailout 
provision noting that the amendments “embraced piecemeal 
bailout” and permitted political subdivisions within a covered 
state to independently apply for bailout.123 The Court concluded 
its analysis by reading the bailout and preclearance provisions of 
Section 5 as being “governed by a principle of symmetry.”124 The 
Court then ruled that all political units were to be treated as 
political subdivisions for preclearance purposes, and they would 
also be treated as such for bailout purposes.125 Thus, the Supreme 
Court held, in contrast to Rome v. United States,126 that all 
political subdivisions, including municipalities, were eligible to 
independently file a bailout suit.127 
The Supreme Court served a “warning to Congress” through 
its ruling in Northwest Austin.128 Consequently, the Court 
immediately expanded the scope of the bailout provision, allowing 
 
 117 Id. at 203–04. 
 118 Id. at 204. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. at 205–06. 
 121 See Travis Crum, Note, The Voting Rights Act’s Secret Weapon: Pocket 
Trigger Litigation and Dynamic Preclearance, 119 YALE L.J. 1992, 1996 (2010). 
 122 Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 206–07. 
 123 Id. at 209–10. 
 124 Id. at 210. 
 125 Id. 
 126 City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 168–69 (1980) (denying cities 
such as Rome the ability to identify as a “political subdivision” and apply for a bailout). 
 127 Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 211. 
 128 Crum, supra note 121, at 1995–96. 
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more covered jurisdictions to apply for a bailout.129 More 
significantly, the Court called into question Section 5’s 
constitutionality.130 Specifically, the Court found that Section 5 
violated principles of federalism131 and required an adjusted 
coverage formula.132 After the Court’s ruling, scholars and 
practitioners debated whether the bailout provision was, indeed, 
effective and could save Section 5 from being ruled unconstitutional.133 
Presenting skepticism towards the use of the bailout 
provision, Hans von Spakovsky of the Heritage Foundation 
argued that the bailout provision was not sufficient to make 
Section 5 constitutional, because Section 5 coverage failed to 
adapt to more contemporary voting conditions.134 The practices 
that Section 5 was originally created to stop were now, von 
Spakovsky argued, “fad[ing] into history,” causing Section 4(b)’s 
coverage formula to become an arbitrary measure of which states 
were violating the right to vote based on race.135 According to von 
Spakovsky, the coverage formula was, from its outset, an 
imprecise measure of racially discriminatory behavior since it 
used proxies such as voter registration rates and voter turnout 
rates, but, as registration and turnout rates gained parity, the 
formula’s imprecision grew into arbitrariness.136 Congress could 
then only be understood to have passed the VRA due to political 
pressures.137 Though von Spakovsky correctly noted that black 
and white voter registration and turnout rates were reaching 
parity, Congress’s findings that “second generation” voting 
 
 129 Jason J. Kelley, Comment, Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act is No Longer 
Tailored to Remedy Current Patterns of Voting Discrimination: The State of Section 5 
After Northwest Austin Utility District No. 1 v. Holder, 48 DUQ. L. REV. 67, 82 (2010). 
 130 Randall T. Adams, Recent Development, Northwest Austin Utility District 
Number One v. Holder, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 135, 146 (2010); Crum, supra note 
121, at 1995–96 (2010); Kelley, supra note 129, at 82. 
 131 Adams, supra note 130, at 144. 
 132 Kelley, supra note 129, at 82. 
 133 CLC Staff, New Hampshire Becomes First State to Bailout from Voting 
Rights Act Preclearance Requirements, CAMPAIGN LEGAL CTR. (Mar. 3, 2013), 
http://www.campaignlegalcenter.org/news/press-releases/new-hampshire-becomes-first-
state-bailout-voting-rights-act-preclearance [https://perma.cc/82KD-WGZH]; Hans von 
Spakovsky, The Bailout Bait and Switch: DOJ’s Last Ditch Attempt to Rescue Section 5 
of the Voting Rights Act, HERITAGE FOUND. (Apr. 18, 2011), http://www.heritage.org/
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rights-act [https://perma.cc/CR4N-Y33M]. 
 134 von Spakovsky, supra note 133. Similar to Chief Justice Roberts, von 
Spakovsky was concerned that Section 5 of the VRA did not use more recent data regarding 
voter registration and voter turnout rates to determine if states needed to remain under 
federal oversight. See id. (“Indeed, as the Supreme Court recently observed, ‘the 
registration gap between white and black voters is in single digits in the covered States; 
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barriers justified extending the coverage formula and 
preclearance requirements would seem to belie the claim that 
Congress only extended the VRA because of political pressures.138 
Von Spakovsky also argued that bailouts were rarely 
used and rarely granted because of the provision’s “demanding” 
standards, the “political risks” of attempting to secure a bailout, 
such as being labeled as racist by opposing civil rights 
organizations, and the “hostility” of the DOJ’s Voting Section 
within its Civil Rights Division.139 With the bailout provisions, 
the DOJ and civil rights activists would be able to force covered 
jurisdictions to “acced[e] to their political demands” which are 
outside the scope of the VRA.140 Yet, when lawyers or scholars 
asked jurisdictions why they had not applied for a bailout or did 
not apply earlier, jurisdictions named lack of knowledge about 
the bailout provisions and “belie[f that] the bailout process was 
too complicated, time consuming, or costly” as the reasons rather 
than fear of being labeled as racist.141 When jurisdictions applied 
for bailout provisions, they found such worries to be 
unfounded.142 Though von Spakovsky asserted that the bailout 
provisions were difficult to achieve, in contrast, J. Gerald 
Hebert, Senior Director of Voting Rights and Redistricting at 
The Campaign Legal Center,143 argued that, in practice, 
jurisdictions did not actually face such difficulties in their 
bailout applications.144 
The Campaign Legal Center viewed the bailout provision to 
be a measure demonstrating the appropriateness of Section 5’s 
preclearance coverage.145 The Campaign Legal Center hailed New 
Hampshire as a model of a successful bailout of Section 5 
coverage.146 J. Gerald Hebert, who represented New Hampshire, 
remarked that the successful bailout demonstrated how “the 
coverage formula self-tailors” and “adjusts to current needs” and 
that the bailout provisions were, indeed, workable.147 Hebert had, 
 
 138 Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act 
Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, § 2(b), 120 Stat. 577, 
577 (2006); Daniel P. Tokaji, The New Vote Denial: Where Election Reform Meets the 
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disenfranchisement, voting machines, and voter [identification] laws” as “second 
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 139 von Spakovsky, supra note 133. 
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 142 Id. at 271–72. 
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himself, argued in favor of the bailout provisions prior to the 
Northwest Austin ruling.148 He argued that the bailout provisions 
and coverage formula worked together to allow jurisdictions to 
publicly prove that their elections were no longer discriminatory.149 
After a jurisdiction was bailed out, Hebert claimed the bailout 
provisions and coverage formula limited the costs of voting rights 
litigation and eased the ability of jurisdictions to change their 
electoral laws.150 Despite the decision in Northwest Austin and the 
subsequent debates, Congress, much to the chagrin of the Supreme 
Court, made no changes to the VRA.151 The next major challenge to 
the VRA came in 2013 from Shelby County, Alabama.152 
III. THE SUPREME COURT STRIKES DOWN THE COVERAGE 
FORMULA IN SHELBY COUNTY V. HOLDER 
A. The Coverage Formula is Ruled Unconstitutional 
Shelby County, Alabama sued the DOJ after the 
department challenged and blocked a referendum election that 
had not been precleared.153 The county argued that Section 4(b), 
which defined the coverage formula, and Section 5 of the VRA 
were unconstitutional and merited a permanent injunction 
against their enforcement.154 The District Court ruled against 
Shelby County, noting that Congress used sufficient evidence to 
justify reauthorizing Sections 4(b) and 5.155 Shelby County 
appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia Circuit, which also ruled against the county.156 The 
court reasoned that there was sufficient evidence to conclude 
that litigation under Section 2 of the VRA was “inadequate . . . to 
protect the rights of minority voters” in jurisdictions covered by 
Section 5.157 The court also opined that Section 4 worked in 
tandem with Section 5 “to single out the jurisdictions in which 
 
 148 Hebert, supra note 18, at 271. 
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 151 Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 548–50 (2013) (remarking upon 
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discrimination is concentrated,” allowing Section 4 to be judged 
as constitutional as well.158 The Supreme Court, however, did not 
believe Section 4(b)’s formula to be justified any longer, nor did 
it believe the bailout provisions to be a sufficient safety valve in 
case the formula was overinclusive.159 
Writing for the majority of the Supreme Court, Chief 
Justice Roberts returned to Northwest Austin’s reasoning 
concerning the “‘fundamental principle of equal sovereignty’ 
among the States.”160 Though previous Supreme Court cases 
since the South Carolina v. Katzenbach decision found the 
problem of racial discrimination in voting constituted a 
legitimate reason to treat states differently, the Chief Justice in 
Shelby County found that “[n]early 50 years later, things have 
changed dramatically.”161 The Court once again noted the parity 
in voter registration and turnout rates between black and white 
Americans, the increase in minority representatives, and the 
length of time that racially discriminatory “tests and devices” 
had been outlawed.162 Armed with this data, the Court took aim 
at Section 4 to determine whether it remained “constitutional in 
light of current conditions.”163 
Chief Justice Roberts, unlike in Northwest Austin, was not 
persuaded that the coverage formula and preclearance 
requirements were justified, for the coverage formula used 
outdated information to select the covered states.164 The Court 
also took issue with the fact that though Congress used a wealth 
of evidence to make its decision to extend the VRA, it left the 
coverage formula unchanged rather than updating it.165 In its 
final analysis of Section 4, the Court concluded, “Congress could 
have updated the coverage formula at that time, but did not do 
so.166 Its failure to act leaves us today with no choice but to declare 
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§ 4(b) unconstitutional.”167 Though the Court made no ruling on 
the bailout provision, by rendering the coverage formula 
inoperable, the Court essentially nullified the bailout provision.168 
The Shelby County decision spurred immediate debate focusing on 
which sections of the VRA could make up for the loss of 
preclearance coverage.169 
Bruce E. Cain, a professor of political science,170 identified 
the VRA’s vulnerability to a decision such as Shelby County as 
stemming from the coverage formula’s imprecision in a system 
centered around states rather than a national system.171 While 
the VRA worked well to combat first-generation voting 
discrimination such as literacy tests, poll taxes, and redistricting, 
especially when the focus was solely on disparities between black 
and white voters, the act was ill-equipped to combat more recent 
tools of voter discrimination. As old tools fell by the wayside, states 
implemented techniques such as “voter caging, harsh voter 
[identification] laws, [and] registration restrictions”;172 moreover, 
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“new minorit[y]” voters, such as Asian American and Latinx 
American173 voters, increased the country’s ethnic diversity.174 Cain 
argued that standardizing voting processes on a national level was 
“[t]he best long-term solution” but was unlikely to be put into place 
in the near future.175 Increased use of Section 3 and Section 2 
litigation were, then, the best solutions in the short-term. Some 
scholars, such as Edward B. Foley, proposed purely private 
solutions.176 On the ground, however, the Justice Department 
decided to pursue the strategy of increasing Section 2 litigation.177 
B. States and the DOJ Respond to the Shelby County 
Ruling 
After Shelby County, several states previously covered 
under Section 5, such as Texas and North Carolina, passed 
restrictive voter ID laws such as H.B. 589.178 The DOJ responded 
by bringing Section 2 lawsuits.179 Though Section 2 litigation was  
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 174 Cain, supra note 169, at 340. 
 175 Id. 
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days and hours. The Fourth Circuit, however, struck down North Carolina’s law. Id.  
 179 Stephanopoulos, supra note 169. 
2018] A NEW VOTING RIGHTS ACT 243 
not as effective at stopping discriminatory voting laws from 
being enacted, it was more successful than expected.180 Yet, 
despite the unexpected victories of Section 2 litigation, a need 
for a stronger voting law remained. 
In the year following Shelby County, the Brennan Center 
for Justice found that (1) Section 5 no longer prevented 
discriminatory voting changes before they even came into effect; 
(2) “challenging discriminatory laws” became increasingly 
“difficult, expensive, and time-consuming;” and (3) transparency 
was lost to the public as jurisdictions no longer had to disclose 
information about proposed laws under Section 5.181 Without the 
preclearance regime in effect, states previously covered under 
Section 5 began passing laws that had already been blocked or 
would likely have been blocked. 
Starting after the Shelby County decision and going 
through to the 2014 midterms, “fifteen states passed or 
implemented” restrictive voting laws “rang[ing] from strict photo 
ID requirements to early voting cutbacks to registration 
restrictions.”182 Texas, in particular, was able to pass a law that had 
previously been blocked by Section 5.183 While the laws in states 
like Texas184 and North Carolina185 were challenged soon after they 
were implemented, the cases continued through 2018 and 2017, 
respectively.186 These cases demonstrated the challenges that 
Section 2 litigation presented in the aftermath of Shelby County.187 
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Section 2 litigation presented stark contrasts to Section 
5 litigation.188 Section 2 proved to be far more resource-intensive 
by placing the burden of proof primarily on plaintiffs, requiring 
knowledge few lawyers possessed, requiring resources beyond 
the capacities of most impact-litigation organizations, and 
demanding the voluminous production of documents as well as 
expert witnesses.189 Section 2 litigation could also cost up to 
hundreds of thousands or even millions of dollars, much of which 
were paid by public funds.190 Section 2 litigation also lasted, on 
average, “between two to five years.”191 One or more national 
elections could therefore occur with potentially discriminatory 
voting laws in place. Along with the inability to block potentially 
discriminatory legislation, the costs borne by Section 2 
litigation, the loss of transparency, the loss of the coverage 
formula, and voter registration challenges produced a decrease 
in voter registration numbers.192 
North Carolina presented a particularly egregious 
example of how the loss of the coverage formula worked in 
tandem with a failure to comply with the National Voter 
Registration Act (NVRA).193 Through the NVRA, states are 
required to offer voter registration at public assistance agencies 
and motor vehicle offices.194 Due to its noncompliance with the 
NVRA, North Carolina experienced a “shocking decrease” in 
submitted voter registration applications.195 Congress attempted 
to address the needs of voters with the VRAA of 2015, but the 
bill ultimately failed to pass.196 
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IV. VOTING RIGHTS ADVANCEMENT ACT OF 2017 
The VRAA of 2015 attempted to update the coverage 
formula, continue protections for language minorities, include 
protections for voters with disabilities, and increase 
transparency.197 Under a new coverage formula, the VRAA of 
2015 would have covered Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, 
California, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, New York, 
North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia.198 Further, 
the VRAA of 2015 would have lifted coverage of any jurisdiction 
that had not violated the law within ten years.199 The VRAA of 
2015 also required jurisdictions to publicly post all changes to 
their voting laws that occurred within 180 days of an election.200 
The proposed act empowered the Attorney General to send 
federal observers to polls during early voting and Election Day 
to monitor any possible racial discrimination.201 Additionally, the 
VRAA of 2015 provided protections for Native Americans and 
Alaska Natives by increasing language access and access to 
registration and polls “on and off of Indian reservations.”202 The 
bill, however, “died” in Congress.203 Congress moved again in 
2017 to restore the VRA. 
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Despite its earlier setbacks, Congress reintroduced the 
VRAA in 2017.204 The bill, if it was enacted, would have put the 
same thirteen states under the coverage formula as the proposed 
VRAA of 2015205 and would have examined the actions of covered 
states from the years 1990 to 2015.206 The bill would have also 
increased judicial scrutiny of voter identification laws and laws 
that “reduce multilingual voting materials.”207 House 
Republicans, however, have not supported the bill.208 Congress 
should therefore liberalize the bailout provisions through 
another round of amendments to increase the chances of passing 
the VRAA into law.209 
To effectuate such a liberalization, Congress should follow 
the lead of the 1982 amendments and “recognize and reward” 
good conduct.210 The exemptions to the NVRA provide such an 
example. Along with requiring states to designate public offices 
as places that offer voter registration, the NVRA also 
“required . . . state[s] to accept and use . . . mail voter registration 
application form[s].”211 Six states, however, were able to gain 
exemptions from the NVRA’s requirements due to their voter 
registration practices.212 North Dakota received an exemption as 
it did not have voter registration requirements.213 Minnesota, 
Wisconsin, and Wyoming qualified for the exemption for having 
registration available at polling places statewide during Election 
Day, and New Hampshire and Idaho were exempted for adding 
Election Day registration after the NVRA’s original date but 
before the NVRA was amended to take effect in 1993.214 
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Following the example of the NVRA, the amendments to 
the bailout provision should affirmatively, rather than 
punitively, encourage states under Section 5 coverage to achieve 
parity in voting. As Chief Justice Roberts stated in Shelby 
County, “[t]he [Fifteenth] Amendment is not designed to punish 
for the past; its purpose is to ensure a better future.”215 
Liberalized bailout provisions in combination with the VRAA’s 
new coverage formula will ensure a better future for equitable 
and affirmative voting procedures in the United States. 
V. BAILOUT PROVISION AMENDMENTS FOR THE VRAA OF 
2017 
In the VRAA of 2017, states and their political 
subdivisions can be subjected to federal oversight for ten years 
if they have either (1) committed fifteen or more voting rights 
violations during the past twenty-five years; or (2) committed 
ten or more voting rights violations during the past twenty-five 
years and at least one of those violations was committed by the 
state itself.216 In the previous VRA, a state could request a 
bailout from Section 5 of the VRA if it could prove that it had no 
longer engaged in voting discrimination for at least ten years.217 
If its bailout request was approved, the state would receive a 
declaratory judgment from the D.C. Circuit Court.218 One of the 
factors considered by the court is whether a state “engaged in 
constructive efforts to eliminate intimidation and harassment of 
persons exercising rights” to vote regardless of race or color.219 
The court also considered whether a state “engaged in other 
constructive efforts, such as expanded opportunity for 
convenient registration and voting for every person of voting age 
and the appointment of minority persons as election officials 
throughout the jurisdiction and at all stages of the election and 
registration process.”220 Even after receiving a favorable 
declaratory judgment, the state would remain under the court’s 
supervision for ten years and could be recalled under Section 5 
if the state subsequently engaged in voter discrimination.221 
Southern representatives have complained that such bailout 
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standards are impossible to achieve.222 Congressional supporters 
of the VRAA must amend the bailout provisions in order to gain 
the bipartisan support necessary to pass the VRAA. 
Southern members of Congress as well as members from 
newly covered states such as Florida would likely be quite 
hostile to such a bailout provision.223 To assuage concerns that 
the bailout provision may be too onerous for covered 
jurisdictions, supporters of the VRAA should propose 
amendments for the bailout based on the Butler amendments 
that were offered, though ultimately rejected in 1975,224 and on 
the original bailout provisions. Representative M. Caldwell 
Butler of Virginia proposed amending the bailout provisions in 
the following ways: a jurisdiction would be permitted 
to escape coverage . . . if: (1) sixty percent of minority citizens were 
registered and had voted “in the most recent general election for 
President or Members of Congress”; (2) no objections had been made 
under section 5 during the two years preceding the action; (3) during 
the previous five years the jurisdiction had not had a final judgment 
issued against it for violating the voting rights of minorities, had not 
used a “test or device,” and had made all required submissions; and 
(4) “an affirmative legislative program” had been undertaken to 
eliminate legal and procedural barriers to full and effective minority 
political participation.225 
Members of Congress and the Supreme Court would likely be 
receptive to an “affirmative legislative program” to make the 
bailout provisions affirmative rather than punitive. According to 
Representative Butler’s proposal, an “affirmative legislative 
program” needed to offer: 
(a) citizens eligible to vote an opportunity to register during evenings 
on a reasonable number of days each month and on a reasonable 
number of Saturdays and Sundays of each month; (b) reasonable public 
notice of the opportunity to register; (c) a place of registration and a 
place for voting at a location with access to and not an unreasonable 
distance from the place of residence of every eligible citizen of voting 
age residing within such State or political subdivisions; (d) reasonable 
provision for minority representation among election officials at polling 
places where minorities are registered to vote; (e) apportionment plans 
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which assure equal voter representation; (f) apportionment plans which 
avoid submergence of cognizable racial or minority groups; (g) removal 
of all unreasonable financial or other barriers to candidacy; and (h) 
adequate opportunity for minority representation in all local governing 
bodies where eligible minority citizens of voting age exceed twenty five 
per centum of the eligible citizens of voting age residing within such 
political subdivisions.226 
Though the second section of Representative Butler’s 
amendment would have allowed jurisdictions to apply for a 
bailout if they had not received any Section 5 objections in the 
two years preceding the bailout petition, the 1965 bailout 
provisions required a showing of five years,227 a far less stringent 
requirement than the 1982 bailout provisions.228 Therefore, the 
bailout provisions for the VRAA could have a five-year baseline 
for both receiving Section 5 objections as well as for using any 
discriminatory tests or devices. Using the Butler amendments 
and the 1965 bailout provisions as bases for new amendments, 
Congress could enact new bailout provisions which would help 
usher the VRAA into law. 
In continuing with the trend of recent enactments and 
Supreme Court opinions, Congress should propose amended 
bailout provisions for the VRAA which would reward states that 
not only stop passing discriminatory voting laws but also take 
“constructive efforts” to end voter intimidation and harassment 
and expand registration and voting by implementing “affirmative 
legislative programs.”229 Congress could draft the amendments as 
follows: a jurisdiction covered by Section 5 may apply for a 
declaratory judgment from the U.S. District Court for the District 
of Columbia to be released from preclearance requirements if it 
can show that (1) the registration and voting rates of minority and 
non-minority voters have a gap of no more than five percentage 
points (e.g., 65 percent minority registration to 70 percent non-
minority registration); (2) no objections have been made in the 
five years preceding the application; (3) during the previous five 
years the jurisdiction had not had a final judgment issued against 
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it for violating the voting rights of minorities, had not used a test 
or device, and had made all required submissions; (4) the 
jurisdiction has not been assigned any federal examiners or 
observers within the preceding five years; and (5) an affirmative 
legislative program had been undertaken to eliminate legal and 
procedural barriers to full and effective minority political 
participation.230 Further, the affirmative legislative program 
must be submitted in writing to the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Columbia to be determined whether it will indeed 
increase minority civic participation. 
A jurisdiction should be allowed to submit a combination 
of any of the following as part of its affirmative program; 
additionally, the list should not be exhaustive as to further 
encourage innovation and experimentation among the states: (1) 
opportunities for eligible citizens to register to vote on evenings 
and weekends; (2) opportunities for eligible citizens to vote 
outside of Election Day; (3) reasonable public notice of the 
opportunity to register; (4) a place to register and a place to vote 
accessible to every eligible citizen from their place of residence; 
(5) reasonable provision for minority representation among 
election officials at polling places where minorities are 
registered to vote; (6) apportionment plans which assure equal 
voter representation; (7) apportionment plans which avoid the 
submergence of cognizable racial or minority groups; (8) removal 
of all financial or other barriers to candidacy; and (9) adequate 
opportunity for minority representation in all local governing 
bodies where minorities exceed 25 percent of citizens eligible to 
vote.231 Using these amended bailout provisions, Congress is 
more likely to pass the VRAA as the provisions are partially 
based on amendments previously offered by a southern 
Republican who saw the preclearance regime as a stigma upon 
southern states.232 The amended provisions will also allow states 
to create their own affirmative solutions to voter discrimination 
and disparities and aid individual members as well as their 
political party in successfully competing for new voters. 
A. The Amended Bailout Provisions Would Gain 
Congressional Republican Support for the VRAA 
Republicans, especially those from states covered by the 
preclearance regime, have viewed Section 5 as putting a “scarlet 
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letter” on southern states.233 They have also viewed the bailout 
provisions as being impossible to attain.234 Congressional 
Republicans would thus be highly skeptical of a VRAA in which 
not only the updated coverage formula but also the amended 
bailout provisions were written primarily, if not solely, by 
Democrats and even more by Democrats from northern and 
western states. 
Congressional Republicans would, on the other hand, be 
much more likely to support bailout provisions based largely on 
the Butler amendments proposed in 1975 for the following 
reasons. First, under these proposed amendments, states will 
gain the ability to innovate and experiment with their election 
laws to fully include the political participation of minority 
voters. Judges, politicians, and academics have leveled critiques 
at the federal government for “commandeering” states to adopt 
policies favored by the federal government.235 The amended 
bailout provisions avoid such a critique by offering a list of 
possible policy solutions to racial disparities in voting by 
allowing the states to choose which policies would work best for 
them or to implement policies not included on the list. By 
adopting such an approach, Congress would allow states to, 
quite literally, operate as “laboratories of democracy.”236 Though 
supporters of robust enforcement of federal voting laws may 
voice concerns about a more decentralized approach allowing 
some states to lag behind and repeat the “all deliberate speed” 
pace of reforms as was seen during school desegregation,237 
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congressional supporters of the VRAA could emphasize that 
when put together with the new coverage formula, the bailout 
amendments would encourage states to promote the full political 
participation of minorities while complying with federal laws 
through the preclearance regime. Minority voters will have 
amassed enough organized political power through the 
affirmative efforts of the state to hold states accountable once 
the state has been bailed out of Section 5. Members of Congress 
will also be more accountable to their constituents through the 
amended bailout provisions. 
Second, through their use of affirmative measures to 
politically empower minority voters, representatives and 
senators seen as supporting such policies will be able to use their 
record to gain the votes of newly registered voters. Supporters of 
the VRAA would then be able to counteract the current set of 
incentives used to dilute the power of minority voters. At 
present, politicians can enact discriminatory redistricting 
measures to guarantee their seat in Congress.238 Under a regime 
of the VRAA’s coverage formula and the proposed bailout 
provision amendments, members of Congress will instead be 
encouraged to promote fair apportionments of voters in districts 
to gain a bailout. With a bailout on record, a member of Congress 
can then tout both the bailout and the increased political 
participation as reasons for voters to support the member of 
Congress. Moreover, if able to gain passage, supporters of the 
VRAA could rest assured that the VRAA would survive judicial 
scrutiny from the Roberts Court. The amended bailout 
provisions would address the Court’s concern about states 
retaining sovereignty and equal treatment from the federal 
government through less stringent and more contemporary 
bailout criteria along with a state-based affirmative program. 
B. The Amended Bailout Provisions Would Pass Judicial 
Scrutiny 
The VRAA addresses the Supreme Court’s concern of 
punishing states based on outdated data, so the amended bailout 
provisions must assuage the Court’s worry about maintaining the 
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equal sovereignty of states. The VRAA with the amended bailout 
provisions would survive the Court’s analysis for three reasons. 
First, the new coverage formula itself only brings states with 
recent records of discrimination in voting under the preclearance 
regime.239 Second, states under the preclearance regime would 
undergo an identical process to obtain a bailout. Congress would 
establish such an identical process by maintaining the 
requirement for covered states to petition the U.S. District Court 
for the District of Columbia for a declaratory judgment as opposed 
to petitioning their local district courts. 
Each state seeking a bailout must go before the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Columbia to receive a declaratory 
judgment240 and would thus receive a similar analysis from three-
judge panels that may contain some of the same judges. Southern 
states have initially viewed being assigned to the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Columbia as disadvantageous as the 
judges were viewed as more “cosmopolitan” by Congress.241 States 
would, however, likely have complaints about unequal treatment 
if they instead appealed to district courts within their own 
jurisdiction. Though states may believe that remaining in their 
jurisdiction with judges likely hailing from their state would 
provide a sort of home field advantage, decisions from the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit show that states 
are not more likely to win their case just by appealing to an in-
state or regional court.242 Indeed, an in-state or regional federal 
court may even write an opinion with phrases easily quoted by 
national media outlets leading to further stigmatization of the 
state.243 States may then contend that the federal courts in their 
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jurisdiction are applying a more stringent standard than federal 
courts in other jurisdictions that have granted more bailout 
requests. States can charge no such claim when each state must 
approach the same court for a bailout. 
Further, to remain in compliance with Northwest Austin, 
Congress must now allow counties, cities, and townships to apply 
for bailouts independent of the state.244 Covered states with large 
cities, such as Nashville, Charlotte, and Atlanta, known for more 
liberal politics and larger minority populations, have clashed with 
those cities regarding legislative agendas.245 States may then 
accuse local district courts of favoritism if it seems cities are 
obtaining bailouts at a higher rate than states. Such complaints 
of favoritism would be multiplied when judging courts in other 
states as well. States, cities, and townships would thus all greatly 
benefit from petitioning only the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Columbia for bailout requests despite the 
inconvenience of litigating their case outside of their state. Critics 
of maintaining federal oversight through district courts or the 
DOJ have also proposed the possibility of using independent 
agencies to enforce federal voting laws.246 
An independent agency available to review applications to 
be bailed out of the preclearance regime would also pass the test 
of providing an identical process to each jurisdiction that would 
come before it. Agencies, however, may actually lessen the 
chances of passage for the VRAA. The objective and disinterested 
nature of independent agencies is constantly in question.247 
Members of Congress hesitant to support the VRAA may be 
dissuaded by the possibility of going before an agency vulnerable 
to “regulatory capture.”248 District court judges, on the other hand, 
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have not had their independence and objectivity questioned to 
such a degree.249 As the sole court to oversee bailout applications, 
the District Court for the District of Columbia has also developed 
an expertise regarding such matters.250 A new agency would have 
to begin building anew its knowledge base of both the process and 
substance of adjudicating bailout proceedings. Thus, for both 
procedural and substantive reasons, members of Congress will be 
more likely to support the VRAA that maintains the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Columbia as the judicial forum for bailout 
proceedings rather than moving them to an independent agency. 
Jurisdictions applying for bailout would also maintain equal 
sovereignty as the bailout requirements would be much more 
similar to the requirements at the time of South Carolina v. 
Katzenbach than the requirements at the time of Shelby County.251 
Third, the amended bailout provisions revert to 
requirements like those upheld in South Carolina v. Katzenbach. 
By adopting the Butler amendments, however, Congress will 
have made the bailout provisions more affirmative rather than 
punitive. The Shelby County Court wrote that the Fifteenth 
Amendment was intended to look towards the future rather than 
to the past.252 With bailout provisions similar to those accepted by 
the Katzenbach Court and measures to allow states to be 
rewarded for increasing voter registration and civic participation, 
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the bailout amendments will address the Court’s concern about 
the VRA punishing certain states for past acts. The Court will also 
likely look favorably upon the affirmative measures of the bailout 
provisions as the states are able to choose independently whether 
to adopt those measures, create their own measures not thought 
of by Congress, or some combination of the two. With states 
having the independence to choose their own affirmative 
measures, the Roberts Court will likely see the amended bailout 
provisions as increasing the amount of sovereignty states enjoy in 
administering their voting laws as compared to the amount of 
sovereignty states were granted by the preclearance regime 
reviewed by the Court in Shelby County. 
By creating a new coverage formula, providing the same 
judicial forum for all jurisdictions applying for a bailout, reducing 
the amount of time required to prove that discriminatory tests and 
devices have ceased, and allowing states to choose their own 
affirmative measures to encourage voter registration and civic 
participation, the VRAA with amended bailout provisions will 
satisfy the Supreme Court’s requirement that the principle of equal 
sovereignty among the states not be violated. And if the principle 
has been violated, Congress had violated the principle in a manner 
that rewards jurisdictions for future good acts rather than 
punishing them for prior bad acts. The VRAA would then survive 
judicial scrutiny by meeting the updated coverage formula and 
equal sovereignty tests set by Shelby County v. Holder. 
CONCLUSION 
Americans have long regarded voting to be a core 
component of citizenship. Though the Fifteenth Amendment 
promised equal status and treatment as voters to all Americans, 
Congress needed to pass the Voting Right Act one hundred years 
after the amendment was passed to fulfill that promise. In fact, 
the VRA fulfilled the promise so successfully that the U.S. 
Supreme Court ruled one of its most innovative protections—the 
coverage formula—as antiquated and unconstitutional. Despite 
the Court’s ruling, states formerly covered by the VRA as well 
as states not covered by the VRA subsequently passed restrictive 
voting laws which disproportionately affected voters of color. A 
new law protecting the voting rights of all Americans is needed 
to fulfill the purpose of the VRA and strengthen the U.S. 
electoral system. 
Congress has already addressed the need for a 
modernized coverage formula through the VRAA. Congress is 
not likely to pass the bill, however, without amending the bill in 
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ways to appeal to Republicans. Supporters of the VRAA can gain 
those needed votes by liberalizing the bailout provisions of the 
VRA. The amended bailout provisions will provide states with a 
clear and affirmative path to leave the preclearance regime. In 
the process, minority voters will regain the ability to hold their 
jurisdictions accountable for discriminatory voting practices as 
well as gain political power and organization through the 
implementation of affirmative legislative programs. States and 
their political subdivisions will thus be rewarded and emerge 
from preclearance coverage as more “small-d” democratic 
jurisdictions.253 More importantly, voters like Rosanell Eaton 
will, once again, be rewarded for their political participation and 
civic engagement. 
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